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The salient fact about this year’s Virginia legislative redistricting, insofar as Hampton Roads is concerned, is it confirmed the recentdecline in the political power of the region. For a variety of reasons, including lower than average regional population growth
and the retirement or defeat of senior regional legislators, Hampton Roads’ political power has been on the wane. The region will
move from a situation in which 27 legislators had their districts wholly or partially in Hampton Roads to one next year when only
23 legislators will claim some portion of Hampton Roads in their district. One can sugarcoat this result in various ways, but it is
undeniable that the region’s political clout in the legislative halls of Richmond has declined significantly since the mid-1990s.
The Redistricting Process
Hampton Roads’ representation in the General Assembly has been affected over the years by changing population trends and
shifting political winds. While redistricting under current judicial standards is primarily about equalization of legislative districts
based on population, experiences of the Hampton Roads region show that politics continues to influence the drawing of district
lines.
The Virginia constitution requires that the General Assembly reapportion the Commonwealth every 10 years into electoral districts
that “shall be composed of contiguous and compact territory and shall be so constituted as to give, as nearly as practicable,
representation in proportion to the population of the district.” A number of court decisions have made it clear that the principle of
“one man-one vote” is to be followed and that only a de minimis deviation in population equality is to be permitted.
Since the constitutionally established upper limits on the number of members of the House of Delegates (100) and the Senate
(40) were reached long ago, redistricting in recent decades has consisted of moving district boundaries to reflect shifts in popu-
lation. State legislative district boundaries are drawn to meet court-imposed standards of equal population and of access of
minorities to the political system. In contrast to historical custom, district lines now are drawn irrespective of local jurisdictional
boundaries. 
The General Assembly approved new state legislative district lines in April 2001. Redistricting took place through the normal leg-
islative process, although a special session was convened specifically for that purpose. Bills describing the new legislative dis-
tricts were drafted by special subcommittees of the House and Senate Privileges and Elections Committees. Public hearings were
held around the state, and the bills were heard in committee and on the floor in each house. Amendments were adopted to cor-
rect technical problems and to reflect changes desired by the majority party. Each house accepted the other’s work, and the bills
were signed by the governor. Maps of the old districts and the newly drawn ones are shown in Figures 1 and 2 for the House
of Delegates and Figures 3 and 4 for the Senate.
The redistricting plan received approval from the U.S. Department of Justice in early June 2001, as required under the Voting
Rights Act, but is the subject of a lawsuit challenging its constitutionality. Only minor changes, if any, are likely to result from
these reviews. 
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FIGURE 1
The Old 1990 House of Delegates Districts in Hampton Roads
FIGURE 2
The New 2001 House of Delegates Districts in Hampton Roads
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FIGURE 3
The Old 1990 Senate Districts in Hampton Roads
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FIGURE 4
The New 2001 Senate Districts in Hampton Roads
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FIGURE 5
Virginia's Population Growth 1990-2000 
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Population changes drive legislative redistricting. Figure 5 depicts population growth in Virginia between 1990 and 2000. It is
apparent that except for several university towns and a few larger cities such as Lynchburg and Chesapeake, significant popula-
tion growth in the Commonwealth occurred primarily in Richmond and Northern Virginia. As Figure 6 demonstrates, within
Hampton Roads, James City County recorded an impressive rate of growth in population. Suffolk, along with Accomack, Isle of
Wight and York counties, also recorded healthy growth rates. Norfolk, Portsmouth and Franklin lost population during the
decade. Williamsburg, Newport News, Hampton and Virginia Beach grew during the decade, but at less than the
Commonwealth average. Table 1 provides specifics. The region’s population continues to be sensitive to U.S. Department of
Defense spending. 
Taking everything into account, population growth in Hampton Roads was modest. Table 2 demonstrates that Hampton Roads
grew about half as fast as the Richmond metropolitan area and only about a quarter as fast as Northern Virginia.
Hampton Roads usually has been considered part of the “golden crescent” of economic growth and prosperity, running
from Northern Virginia down the I-95 corridor to Richmond and east to Hampton Roads. However, measured by popula-
tion changes in the past decade in the three metropolitan statistical areas that are in the crescent, Hampton Roads did not
share the golden gleam of growth of the other regions. Figure 7 demonstrates this fact visually. Since the Reagan defense
buildup of the 1980s, Hampton Roads’ population growth has trailed that of Richmond and Northern Virginia by substan-
tial margins.  
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FIGURE 6
A Closer Look at Population Growth in Hampton Roads
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TABLE 1
Population Changes Inside Hampton Roads, 1900-2000
Locality 1990 Population 2000 Population 1990-2000 Change Percentage Change
Cities
Chesapeake 151,982 199,184 47,202 31.06%
Franklin 8,392 8,346 -46 -0.55%
Hampton 133,773 146,437 12,664 9.47%
Newport News 171,477 180,150 8,673 5.06%
Norfolk 261,250 234,403 -26,847 -10.28%
Poquoson 11,005 11,566 561 5.10%
Portsmouth 103,910 100,565 -3,345 -3.22%
Suffolk 52,143 63,677 11,534 22.12%
Virginia Beach 393,089 425,257 32,168 8.18%
Williamsburg 11,600 11,998 398 3.43%
Counties
Accomack 31,703 38,305 6,602 20.82%
Isle of Wight 25,053 29,728 4,675 18.66%
Northampton 13,061 13,093 32 0.25%
Surry 6,145 6,829 684 11.13%
York 42,434 56,297 13,863 32.67%
Totals 1,417,017 1,525,835 108,818 7.68%
State
Virginia 6,189,197 7,078,515 889,318 14.37%
FIGURE 7
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TABLE 2
MSA Population Growth, 1990-2000
Metropolitan 1990 2000 1990-2000 Percentage
Statistical Areas Population Population Change Change
Norfolk 1,430,974 1,551,351 120,377 8.41% 
Richmond 865,640 996,512 130,872 15.12% 
Northern Virginia 1,732,437 2,167,757 435,320 25.13% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census
The Mechanics Of The Redistricting Process
Population losses and the slow growth of the region impacted the number of people living in each legislative district. According
to the 2000 Census numbers, House of Delegate districts in whole or in part in Hampton Roads showed the highest regional
deviations in the state for under-population from the reapportionment standard population of 70,785 people per district. The
same was true of Senate districts, deviating from the ideal population of 176,963; the greatest amount of deviation for under-
population was in Hampton Roads.
TABLE 3
Legislative Districts in Whole or in Part in Hampton Roads - 2000
(Before Redistricting)
Source: Division of Legislative Services, Virginia General Assembly
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Delegate Districts
(Ideal District Population 70,785)
District Population Deviation Percent
Deviation
21 67,070 -3,715 -5.2
64 71,068 283 0.4
75 65,717 -5,068 -7.2
76 74,724 3,939 5.6
77 67,258 -3,527 -5.0
78 91,663 20,878 29.5
79 71,380 595 0.8
80 51,524 -19,261 -27.2
81 63,697 -7,088 -10.0
82 64,139 -6,646 -9.4
83 67,380 -3,405 -4.8
84 79,958 9,173 13.0
85 64,196 -6,589 -9.3
86 45,130 -25,655 -36.2
87 49,877 -20,908 -29.5
88 57,734 -13,051 -18.4
89 55,887 -14,898 -21.0
90 58,008 -12,777 -19.1
91 64,799 -5,986 -8.5
92 60,313 -10,472 -14.8
93 74,347 3,562 5.0
94 64,567 -6,218 -8.8
95 61,021 -9,764 -13.8
96 78,182 7,397 10.4
97 80,843 10,058 14.2
98 72,329 1,544 2.2
100 68,247 -2,538 -3.6
-120,137
Senate Districts
(Ideal District Population 176,963)
District Population Deviation Percent
Deviation
1 189,763 12,800 7.2
2 149,888 -27,075 -15.3
3 181,082 4,119 2.3
5 143,643 -33,320 -18.8
6 136,556 -40,407 -22.8
7 152,111 -24,852 -14.0
8 167,639 -9,324 -5.3
13 176,293 -670 -0.4
14 220,607 43,644 24.7
15 170,373 -6,590 -3.7
18 159,437 -17,526 -9.9
-99,201
While the under-population of the districts in Hampton Roads relates to the lack of population growth in the region, the extent of
the deviation also can be attributed to the fact that the legislative districts drawn in Hampton Roads in 1991 showed the
greatest negative deviation from the ideal size of the district for any region of the state (see Appendix A). In other words, the
legislative districts drawn in 1991 had as few people in them as the legislators felt was possible to meet the court stan-
dard. In fact, in 1991, Hampton Roads legislators were able to delay the full negative impact of the region's slow popula-
tion growth by clever redrawing of districts. The end product was a large number of districts that were "under-populated"
as much as the courts would allow – 5 percent less population than the state average.
In contrast, in 2001 there was a deliberate attempt to stay within a 2 percent deviation of the ideal standard statewide. The
change in approach to redistricting between 1991 and 2001 cost Hampton Roads some legislative representation. 
As Table 4 indicates, had the House of Delegate districts in Hampton Roads been drawn in 1991 with no deviation from the
ideal standard, Hampton Roads would have qualified for 22.9 delegates. Since almost all the districts were drawn permitting a
4 percent deviation of under-population, Hampton Roads ended up with 23.41 delegates, or an approximate one-half position
in additional representation. In 2001, however, Hampton Roads districts were drawn very close to the ideal population, or even
were “slightly over-populated” (higher than the standard), which resulted in 21.38 districts (see Table 4). Had all districts been
drawn exactly to the ideal standard, Hampton Roads would have had 21.56 seats (“.56 of a district” reflects the reality that
one or more legislative districts within Hampton Roads overlap into areas outside of Hampton Roads).
The net loss for the region in 2001 was 2.03 delegates (23.41 minus 21.38). However, if the 2001 districts had not been
over-populated slightly, the net loss would have been 1.85 (23.41 minus 21.56). Had the same population deviations from the
ideal been followed in 2001 that were followed in 1991, the net loss would have been 1.35 (23.41 minus 22.06).
Of course, legislators do not come in fractional parts. If one assumes that a legislator who has some piece of his or her district in
Hampton Roads has an interest in representing the region as much as someone whose district is fully within the region, the con-
trast between what happened in 1991 and 2001 is even greater. As a result of the 1991 redistricting, 27 delegates had
their districts wholly or partially within Hampton Roads. With the 2001 redistricting, that number has dropped to 23, a loss
in representation of four delegates! There is no way one can sugarcoat this outcome, for it represents a very substantial
loss in regional political power. When, in addition, one takes into account the ending of the legislative careers of prominent
and powerful Hampton Roads legislators such as Thomas Moss, Alan Diamonstein, Stanley Walker and Hunter Andrews,
the combined effect represents a blow to the political power of Hampton Roads of huge magnitude. There has been a
curious, though perhaps understandable, lack of recognition of this fact by the Hampton Roads citizenry, the regional power
structure and the media. Yet, the impact of these changes upon the political power and clout of Hampton Roads has been
tremendous.
While political power has many sources, the primary roots of regional legislative power in Virginia are: (1) the number of legis-
lators a region sends to Richmond; (2) the seniority of those legislators; (3) whether they are in the majority party; and (4) the
availability of funds to support political activity. With respect to No. 1, the decline in Hampton Roads representatives (wholly or
partially within Hampton Roads) from 27 to 23 speaks for itself. This constitutes almost a 15 percent decline in the number of
delegates. 
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TABLE 4
The Tale of the Population Numbers
1991 2001
House District Population Standard 61, 874 70,785
Hampton Roads Regional Population 1,417,017 1,525,825
House Districts With No Deviation 22.9 21.56
House Districts Legislated* 23.41 21.38
Difference 0.51 -0.18
*For House districts legislated, that part of a district partially in Hampton Roads is counted as a fractional part of the
population in Hampton Roads.
As far as No. 2 is concerned, legislative affairs in both the House of Delegates and the Senate are highly sensitive to the sen-
iority of individual legislators. Seniority is the primary driver of membership on choice committees, especially the “money commit-
tees” (Appropriations and Finance in the House of Delegates and Finance in the Senate) and on other key panels such as
General Laws, and Corporations, Insurance and Banking in the House of Delegates, and Commerce and Labor, Courts of
Justice, and Rules in the Senate. The most senior legislators nearly always occupy seats on these powerful committees and it is
they who hold leadership positions. They typically are appointed as budget conferees when the House of Delegates and the
Senate work to resolve their differences (if they do!) and “divide up the pie” at the end of a legislative session. The bottom line
is Hampton Roads’ legislative seniority has declined precipitously in recent years and, as an example, the region did not
have a legislator on the final budget conference committee in the 2001 legislative session. Hampton Roads legislators were
forced to look over the shoulders of other legislators and importune, entice and threaten them in an attempt to achieve regional
goals. This is a dramatic change from the situation just a few years ago when Delegate Moss was Speaker of the House,
Delegate Diamonstein was a powerful member of the Appropriations Committee as well as a final budget conferee, Sen.
Walker was President Pro-Tem of the Senate and a final budget conferee, and Sen. Andrews chaired the Senate Finance
Committee and was a final budget conferee.
With respect to No. 3, it is nearly always true that legislators in the party in power are able to exercise more power than legis-
lators in the minority party because they control the agenda, have greater party representation on committees and usually attract
much larger financial contributions from individuals, corporations, unions and pressure groups. For well more than a century, the
Democratic Party dominated Virginia politics and hence Hampton Roads’ predominantly Democratic representation was advanta-
geous. In 2001, though, the wheel has turned and Republicans control nearly everything in sight. However, the region’s core
city (Norfolk) has but one Republican House member and one Republican Senate member, and both are relatively junior. Further,
the sitting governor, James Gilmore, unfortunately has not been well attuned to Hampton Roads and hence the increasingly
Republican cast of the region’s legislative representation has not paid off in the manner one might have anticipated.
Also, cities such as Portsmouth and Hampton are represented primarily by Democrats. Cities such as Virginia Beach and
Portsmouth and the northern end of the Peninsula are represented by Republicans, but on the whole they have not served
in the General Assembly for long periods of time and thus do not yet exercise the obvious power that the Moss-
Diamonstein-Walker-Andrews quartet enjoyed in the days of yore. If these Republicans continue to be re-elected and accu-
mulate seniority, and Republicans continue to be the majority party, then the long-term outlook for political power in
Hampton Roads will be brighter.
The fourth factor noted above, the availability of funds to support political activity, reflects economic power. Many large private
business entities exercise considerable influence and have the potential, directly or indirectly, to provide valuable funds to support
political activities. In this regard, Hampton Roads is disadvantaged relative to Richmond and Northern Virginia. Even broadly
defined, Hampton Roads contains only two Fortune 500 headquarters, while Richmond and Northern Virginia together account
for 10 times as many. Further, per capita income in Hampton Roads trails Richmond by almost 10 percent and Northern Virginia
by nearly 20 percent. Simply put, even after accounting for cost-of-living differentials, there is less discretionary money available
in Hampton Roads to support political candidates and causes. 
Consequently, for most of this decade, Hampton Roads’ political power will be, at least comparatively speaking, at a low ebb.
Once again, this reflects a larger than recognized decline in the number of legislators from Hampton Roads, as well as a signifi-
cant reduction in the seniority of Hampton Roads’ legislators, the political affiliations of these legislators, and in raw economic
power.
The loss of representation for the region was felt most dramatically in House Districts 86 and 88, both of which were in the City
of Norfolk during the 1990s. With the 2001 redistricting, however, House District 86 is now in western Fairfax and eastern
Loudoun counties, and House District 88 is now in Spotsylvania and Stafford counties. Figure 8 shows this.
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FIGURE 8
Some Context On The Politics Of Redistricting
For most of the past century, Virginia apportioned legislative seats based on a combination of factors that included population,
but always with an emphasis on keeping local units of government (cities and counties) intact. And, as has always been the
case, protection of incumbents and the power of the majority party were primary considerations. Up until the 1950s, Virginia’s
legislative districts were considered reasonably apportioned in comparison to other states. Even then, however, the districts
would not have been able to pass the stringent court standards of today. As a general rule, legislative districts in most states
deviated substantially from population, though the Commonwealth was fairer than most.
The 1960 Census saw Virginia’s population increase by a strong 19.5 percent, but growth was not uniform across the state.
Cities and suburbs grew much more rapidly than did the rural areas. As a result, the House legislative districts varied in popula-
tion from 20,071 to 142,597, and Senate district population ranged from 51,637 to 285,194. In one analysis that assumed
that a fairly apportioned district would have a value of 1.00, the seven most heavily populated counties and cities of the state
had a value of .73, while the most sparsely populated areas were over-represented with a value of 1.24. The City of Hampton
had a vote value of .47 and Princess Anne County (which consolidated with Virginia Beach City in 1963) and Virginia Beach
had a value of .47. 
The challenge faced after the 1960 Census by the overwhelmingly dominant Byrd Machine and the Democratic Party was to
protect incumbents – many of whom were from districts in the rural parts of the state – but still somehow respond to urban and
suburban demands for a fair redistricting. The General Assembly made a stab at doing so, but the product of its efforts in the
redistricting of 1962 was not well received.
Four legislators from Arlington and Fairfax counties filed suit on April 9, 1962, and were joined on May 25 by four plaintiffs
from the City of Norfolk, challenging the redistricting plan. The suit charged that the redistricting, “by failing to give representa-
tion commensurate with the population of their areas, devalued their votes and deprived them of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.” 
On November 28, 1962, a three-judge panel declared the redistricting plan invalid. The state appealed the case to the
Supreme Court. On June 15, 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the redistricting failed to meet population standards for
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both houses of the General Assembly. Thus, Virginia and the Hampton Roads area, via the Supreme Court decision, played a
part in setting the judicial standards for redistricting that continue to today.
The General Assembly in 1992 still was controlled by the Democratic Party and still faced the similarly difficult task of attempting
to protect incumbents (many of whom represented primarily rural districts and some of whom were Republicans) and the majority
status of the Democrats. However, historical trends did not favor the Democrats, for their majorities in both houses of the General
Assembly were clearly eroding over time. In 1967, Democrats had 85 members in the House of Delegates; the balance was
14 Republicans and one Independent. In the Senate there were 34 Democrats and six Republicans. By 1991, the numbers had
changed to 58 Democrats, 41 Republicans and one Independent in the House, and to 22 Democrats and 18 Republicans in
the Senate (see Appendix B). The Democrats were desperate to maintain power by stopping the steady erosion of their numbers
in both houses of the General Assembly. At the same time, there was recognition that this would be quite difficult, both because
of the rising Republican tide and the strict judicial standards for redistricting that would have to be met.
Hampton Roads was a key region for the Democrats’ 1991 attempt to hold to power. With the high minority African
American population in many of the Hampton Roads communities and the tendency of those communities to vote
Democratic, the Democrats (as has been shown previously) drew the Hampton Roads legislative districts with the greatest
possible deviation of under-population. While the short-term strategy saved the region some impact of the loss of popula-
tion, it did not prevent the Republicans from continuing to gain strength.
By 2001, Republicans controlled the House and Senate and the process for redistricting. The Republicans drew the Hampton
Roads districts as close to the ideal size as possible in order to limit Democratic strength. It was no coincidence that District 88
eliminated in Norfolk was the legislative district of Delegate Tom Moss, former Democratic Speaker of the House of Delegates.
Final Words
While it is undeniable that the legislative power of Hampton Roads has been reduced significantly in recent years, this is hardly
an “end of the world” scenario. The region still claims 23 legislators of a total of 140. Twenty-three legislators, if they are
united by an attractive agenda and are highly motivated, still can accomplish an enormous amount of good. This number
dwarfs southwestern Virginia’s representation, for example, and is larger than that of Richmond.
What has been lacking in the Hampton Roads delegation in recent years has been unity of purpose. While there is a Hampton
Roads legislative caucus, its meetings usually are poorly attended – more lobbyists are present than legislators, and it is worth
noting that there are separate legislative caucuses for the Peninsula, the Southside and many individual Hampton Roads cities. In
addition, the Legislative Black Caucus claims some portion of the loyalty of more than one-quarter of the region’s legislators.
Membership in these other caucuses does not preclude legislators from uniting behind a common Hampton Roads agenda.
Indeed, it always has been the case that legislators from disparate parts of the Commonwealth have united behind common
interests, for example, the revenue plight of the cities, or K-12 education. Yet, few would dispute the judgment that other regions
(Northern Virginia and Richmond in particular) generally have exhibited more unity of purpose in the General Assembly than
Hampton Roads. The payoff has been observable on several issues, such as the distribution of transportation funding, but also in
other areas, including higher education funding.
What we end up with, then, is yet another situation where the logical regional conclusion is: “We need to get our act
together.” Yes, Hampton Roads’ legislative clout has declined, but there is plenty left. A unified, determined regional leg-
islative delegation remains capable of achieving an impressive number of goals for Hampton Roads.
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APPENDIX A
Delegate Districts In Hampton Roads
1991 and 2001 Redistricting
Note: For districts partially in Hampton Roads, a percentage of a delegate has been assigned to the region equal to the Hampton Roads population in the districts.
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Delegate Delegates Population Deviation Percent Delegates Population Deviation Percent 
Districts 1991 Deviation 2001 Deviation
21 1 64,446 2,572 4 1 72,156 1,371 1.9
76 1 59,638 -2,236 -4 1 71,549 764 1
77 1 63,561 1,687 2.73 1 70,087 -698 -1
78 1 59,374 -2,500 -4.04 1 70,798 13 0
79 1 59,208 -2,666 -4.31 1 72,106 1,321 1.9
80 1 59,024 -2,850 -4.61 1 70,554 -231 -0.3
81 1 59,127 -2,747 -4.44 1 71,175 390 0.6
82 1 60,094 -1,780 -2.88 1 72,134 1,349 1.9
83 1 64,535 2,661 4.3 1 71,766 981 1.4
84 1 59,895 -1,979 -3.2 1 72,090 1,305 1.8
85 1 63,558 1,684 2.72 1 72,039 1,254 1.8
86 1 59,175 -2,699 -4.36
87 1 58,851 -3,023 -4.89 1 72,174 1,389 2
88 1 58,836 -3,038 -4.91
89 1 60,016 -1,850 -3 1 71,874 1,089 1.5
90 1 58,936 -2,938 -4.75 1 71,872 1,087 1.5
91 1 59,449 -2,425 -3.92 1 71,410 625 0.9
92 1 59,009 -2,865 -4.63 1 70,106 -679 -1
93 1 60,509 -1,365 -2.21
94 1 59,150 -2,724 -4.4 1 71,484 699 1
95 1 59,969 -1,905 -3.08 1 70,646 -139 -0.2
100 1 72,110 1,325 1.9
Pt. Districts
64 0.57 36,329 1,060 3 0.7 48,749 -588 -1.2
75 0.11 6,748 -319 -4.69 0.12 8,152 102 -1.2
93 0.96 68,153 -145 -0.2
96 0.51 31,847 480 1.52 0.6 42,651 494 1.2
97 0.18 11,530 208 2.76
98 0.28 17,365 165 0.95
100 0.76 44,764 -2,326 -4.95
23.41 21.38
APPENDIX B
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Political Parties in State Senate
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Political Parties in House of Delegates
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Legislative Sessions
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
D
el
eg
at
es
Democrats Republicans Independents
